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Abstract
Gradient boosted models are a fundamental machine
learning technique. Robustness to small perturbations of
the input is an important quality measure for machine
learning models, but the literature lacks a method to prove
the robustness of gradient boosted models.
This work introduces VERIGB, a tool for quantifying
the robustness of gradient boosted models. VERIGB en-
codes the model and the robustness property as an SMT
formula, which enables state of the art verification tools
to prove the model’s robustness. We extensively evaluate
VERIGB on publicly available datasets and demonstrate
a capability for verifying large models. Finally, we show
that some model configurations tend to be inherently more
robust than others.
1 Introduction
Gradient boosted models are fundamental in machine
learning and are among the most popular techniques in
practice. They are known to achieve good accuracy with
relatively small models, and are attractive in numerous
domains ranging from computer vision to transporta-
tion [26, 27, 6, 10, 7, 28]. They are easy to use as they
do not require normalization of input features, and they
support custom loss functions as well as classification
and regression. Finally, the method has a solid theoreti-
cal grounding [20].
Machine learning models are often vulnerable to adver-
sarial perturbations, which may cause catastrophic fail-
ures (e.g., by misclassification of a traffic sign). Specifi-
cally, Figure 1 exemplifies that gradient boosted models
are indeed vulnerable to such perturbations. Thus, iden-
Figure 1: Example of the lack of robustness in a gradient
boosted model trained over a traffic signs dataset. In the
first row, an “80 km/h speed limit” sign is misclassified as
a “30 km/h speed limit”. In the second row, a “turn left”
sign is misclassified as “ahead only”. Observe in the third
column (delta, computed as the difference in pixel val-
ues of the two images) that the applied changes are barely
visible to the naked eye (delta of +/-3 in the range of 256
values per pixel per color). The fourth column highlights
the modified pixels.
tifying which models are robust to such manipulations
and which are not is critical. Indeed, numerous works
suggested training techniques that increase the robust-
ness [19, 25]. However, there is currently no method to
formally verify gradient boosted models. Furthermore,
it is not clear how the configuration parameters of such
models affect their robustness. These knowledge gaps
make it challenging to guarantee the reliability of gradient
boosted solutions.
In the last couple of decades, formal methods success-
fully increased the reliability of numerous software and
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hardware systems. Such success gave rise to diverse ver-
ification methods such as model checking, termination
analysis, and abstract interpretation. Formal methods are
especially appealing in situations where the cost of mis-
takes is exceptionally high. Examples include mission-
critical solutions as well as mass-produced hardware. Un-
fortunately, machine learning models are fundamentally
different from traditional software artifacts, and we can-
not directly use existing verification techniques for ma-
chine learning models. The research community already
started addressing the problem for neural network mod-
els [23, 17, 15, 11, 22]. Here we focus on an area that
has not been covered so far – verification of robustness of
gradient boosted models.
The main contribution of this work is the VERIGB tool
for verifying the robustness of gradient boosted models.
VERIGB encapsulates novel and formally proven meth-
ods that translate such models, and robustness properties
into SMT formulas. Then, we feed these formulas to a
standard SMT solver, which proves the robustness or pro-
vides a counter-example. VERIGB includes runtime opti-
mizations that make the verification process practical. We
extensively evaluate it with public datasets and demon-
strate scalability for large and accurate models. Finally,
we highlight that some model configurations are funda-
mentally more robust than others.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion 2 we provide background on logic, decision trees, and
gradient boosted models. Next, in Section 3, we formally
define the robustness properties. The SMT formula rep-
resentation of gradient boosted models is given in Sec-
tion 4, and that of the robustness property in Section 5.
Next, Section 6 suggests optimizations of these encodings
improving their runtime. Section 7 evaluates VERIGB on
several publicly-available datasets, while Section 8 sur-
veys related work. We conclude in Section 9, which dis-
cusses the implications of our work and suggests direc-
tions for future research.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Logic and Linear Arithmetic
A propositional formula is defined inductively as one of
the following: (i) ‘True’ and ‘False’ constants (T and F).
(ii) a variable xi ∈ {x1, . . . , xm}; (iii) if ϕ and ψ are
propositional formulas then so are ¬ϕ, ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ ∧ ψ,
ϕ → ψ, ϕ ↔ ψ (with their usual interpretation). Given a
propositional formula ϕ, the Boolean satisfiability prob-
lem (SAT) determines whether there exists an assignment
under which ϕ evaluates to True.
Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) extends the
Boolean SAT problem by combining a variety of under-
lying theories [1]. We use the linear real arithmetic theory,
which extends the propositional fragment with all rational
number constants, and with the symbols: {+,−, ·,≤,≥}.
A formula ϕ (be that an SMT or SAT instance) is said to
be satisfiable, if ϕ evaluates to True for some assignment
~x ∈ Rm. If there is no such assignment, we say that ϕ is
unsatisfiable.
2.2 Decision Trees
Decision trees are functions that receive an assignment
~x ∈ Rm and return a value. Formally, a decision tree
structure (DTS) D = 〈N, I, L〉 is defined as follows:
• N = {n1, . . . , nk}: is the set of nodes in the tree,
and n1 is defined to be the root node of the tree.
• I ⊆ N : is the subset of internal nodes in the tree. An
internal node is a triplet n = 〈Sn,Tn,Fn〉, where Sn
is a condition expressing the decision of node n (an
SMT formula), and Tn ∈ N (resp., Fn ∈ N ) is the
target successor node when the condition evaluates
to True (resp., False).
• L = N \ I: is the subset of leaf nodes in the tree, i.e.
nodes for which there is no successor. A leaf node
n = 〈Wn〉 also has a weight Wn ∈ R.
Intuitively, S (resp., T and F) is a dictionary that asso-
ciates to every n ∈ I a condition Sn (resp., a positive
child Tn ∈ N and a negative child Fn ∈ N ). W is a dic-
tionary that associates to every n ∈ L a weight Wn ∈ R.
A DTSD is said to be well-formed if, and only if, every
node n ∈ N has exactly one predecessor node, except for
the root node that has no predecessor. In a well-formed
tree, we denote by Pn the predecessor of node n ∈ N .
Given an input vector ~x ∈ Rm, the valuation of a DTS
D on ~x is a function Dˆ : Rm → R. Tree D is traversed
according to ~x, ending in a leaf node n ∈ L, and function
Dˆ(~x) is the weight of that node, i.e. Wn ∈ R.
2
2.3 Gradient Boosted Trees
Gradient boosted regression is an ensemble technique that
constructs a strong learner by iteratively adding weak
learners (typically decision trees) [20]. Formally, a Gradi-
ent Boosted Regressor (GBR) is a sequence of r decision
trees R = 〈D1, . . . , Dr〉. Given an input vector ~x ∈ Rm,
the valuation of a GBR R is the sum of valuations of its
r decision trees. That is, Rˆ(~x) =
∑r
i=1 Dˆi(~x).
Gradient boosted classification is a tree ensemble tech-
nique that constructs a strong learner per each class
(again, by iteratively adding weak learners), to assign a
class for a given input. Let c be the number of classes.
Formally, a Gradient Boosted Classifier (GBC) C =
〈R1, . . . , Rc〉 is a sequence of c gradient boosted regres-
sors, where regressorRj = 〈Dj1, . . . , Djr〉. Given an input
vector ~x ∈ Rm, the valuation of C, valuates all c regres-
sors over ~x and returns the class associated with the max-
imal value, namely: Cˆ(~x) = arg maxj(Rˆj(~x)). We as-
sume that there is an association between each input vec-
tor and a single class1.
3 Robustness of Machine Learning
Models
Robustness means that small perturbations in the input
have little effect on the outcome. That is, for classifiers
the classification remains the same, and for regressors,
the change in valuation is bounded. This section for-
mally defines robustness properties, in a similar manner
to [24, 22, 17, 21].
Consider a regression modelR, and let Rˆ(~x) be the val-
uation function ofR for an input ~x ∈ Rm. We define local
adversarial (, δ)-robustness for an input ~x, as follows:
Definition 3.1 (local adversarial robustness of regressors).
A regression model R is said to be (, δ)-robust for an
input ~x, if for every input ~x′ such that ||~x− ~x′||p < , the
output is bound by δ, i.e., |Rˆ(~x)− Rˆ(~x′)| ≤ δ.
Here, ||~x − ~x′||p is used to specify the distance between
two vectors ~x and ~x′ according to some norm p. For exam-
ple, one may compute the distance between two images
1In cases where multiple regressors return the same maximal value
we can break the symmetry using their indices.
as the maximal difference between pairs of correspond-
ing pixels (i.e., p = ∞), or the sum of these differences
(i.e., p = 1). Throughout this paper we use norm p =∞,
but our techniques are applicable to any norm that is linear
to the input.
Next, consider a classification model C and let Cˆ(~x)
be the valuation function of C for an input ~x ∈ Rm. We
define local adversarial -robustness for an input ~x as fol-
lows:
Definition 3.2 (local adversarial robustness of classifiers).
A classification modelC is said to be -robust for an input
~x, if for every input ~x′ such that ||~x−~x′||p < , the output
does not change its classification, i.e., Cˆ(~x) = Cˆ(~x′).
The above definitions aim to certify a given input but do
not guarantee much regarding the model itself. Therefore,
we extend these definitions to capture the behavior over a
set of inputs A. We define ρ-universal adversarial (, δ)-
robustness on a set of inputs A, as follows:
Definition 3.3 (universal adversarial robustness of regres-
sors). A regression model R is said to be ρ-universally
(, δ)-robust over the set of inputs A, if it is (, δ)-robust
for at least ρ · |A| inputs in A.
Finally, we extend the classifier definition of lo-
cal -robustness, and define ρ-universal adversarial -
robustness on a set of inputs A, as follows:
Definition 3.4 (universal adversarial robustness of classi-
fiers). A classification model C is said to be ρ-universally
-robust over the set of inputsA, if it is -robust for at least
ρ · |A| inputs in A.
Definition 3.3 and Definition 3.4 capture the universal
adversarial robustness properties for regressors and clas-
sifiers. The parameter  determines the allowed perturba-
tion change, that is, how much an attacker can change the
input. For regressors, we also require the parameter δ that
defines the acceptable change in the output, while for clas-
sifiers we require that the classification stays the same.
Finally, the parameter ρ measures the portion of robust
inputs. In Section 7, we evaluate the ρ values of varying
models instead of selecting a ρ value in advance.
3
4 Encodings of Gradient Boosted
Models
This section explains the encoding of gradient boosted
models into SMT formulas. We start by translating a sin-
gle path in a decision tree and then work our way up until
we end up with a formula for the entire model.
4.1 Encoding of Decision Trees
Given a well-formed DTS D = 〈N, I, L〉 and a leaf l ∈
L, we define path(l) to be the set of nodes on the path
in the tree between the leaf node l and the root node n1
(including both nodes). We define the encoding of leaf l
in tree D to be the formula pi(l) as follows:
pi(l) :
∧
n∈path(l)\{n1}
(
TPn = n→ SPn
FPn = n→ ¬SPn
∧
)
∧(wl = Wl)
The encoding pi(l) restricts the decision tree valuation
variable wl to be the weight of the leaf (wl = Wl), and
for each node n in the path except for the root, if node
n is the positive child of its parent (TPn = n) then the
parent condition should hold (SPn ), and if node n is the
negative child of its parent (FPn = n) then the negation
of the parent condition should hold (¬SPn ).
Lemma 4.1 (leaf encoding). Let Dˆ be the valuation func-
tion of the well-formed tree D. If pi(l) evaluates to True,
then there exists a truth assignment ~x ∈ Rm,wl ∈ R such
that Dˆ(~x) reaches leaf l , and Dˆ(~x) = Wl = wl.
Proof. Assume that the leaf encoding pi(l) evaluates to
True, then there exists a truth assignment ~x ∈ Rm,
wl ∈ R. Since the tree is well-formed and following
the definition of path(l), we know that every internal
node n′ ∈ path(l) ∩ I is a predecessor of some node
n ∈ path(l), i.e., n′ = Pn. If n is the positive successor
of n′, then (TPn = n) holds, implying that Sn′ holds for
~x as well. Thus, when the valuation of Dˆ(~x) traverses tree
D and reaches node n′, we know that it indeed turns to the
positive child. The same reasoning applies to the negative
successor of n′. By applying this reasoning recursively
from the root node, we show that the traversal of the val-
uation reaches leaf l, and outputs Dˆ(~x) = Wl = wl.
Given DTS D = 〈N, I, L〉, we now define the encod-
ing of tree D to be the formula Π(D) as follows:
Π(D) :
∨
l∈L
pi(l)
Namely, Π(D) is a disjunction of formulas, where each
disjunct represents a concrete path to one of the leaves in
D and its respective valuation.
Lemma 4.2 (tree encoding). Let Dˆ be the valuation func-
tion of the well-formed tree D. If Π(D) evaluates to True,
then there exists a truth assignment ~x ∈ Rm, wl ∈ R, and
a single leaf l ∈ L for which Dˆ(~x) reaches l and outputs
Dˆ(~x) = Wl = wl.
Proof. Assume that the tree encoding Π(D) evaluates
to True, then there exists a truth assignment ~x ∈ Rm,
wl ∈ R. Clearly, at least one clause in Π(D) evaluates
to True. Since tree D is well formed, at most one clause
in Π(D) evaluates to True, otherwise there exists an in-
ternal node in the path n ∈ path(l) ∩ I for which Sn
is inconsistent over ~x. Therefore, there exists exactly one
clause in Π(D) that evaluates toTrue, and exactly one leaf
l ∈ L for which pi(l) evaluates to True. If pi(l) evaluates
to True, then following the same reasoning of Lemma 4.1,
the truth assignment ~x ∈ Rm, wl ∈ R reaches leaf l and
outputs Dˆ(~x) = Wl = wl.
4.2 Encoding of Gradient Boosted Trees
Given GBR R = 〈D1, . . . , Dr〉 and following
Lemma 4.1, and Lemma 4.2, we define the encoding of
regressor R to be the formula Υ(R) as follows:
Υ(R) :
( r∧
i=1
Π(Di)
)
∧ out =
r∑
i=1
wli
Intuitively, Υ(R) consists of two parts: (i) the conjunction
of all tree encodings, ensuring that the decision tree val-
uation variables of each tree wl1, . . . , wlr are restricted
to their respective tree valuations; and (ii) a restriction of
the regressor valuation variable out to be the sum of all
decision tree valuation variables wl1, . . . , wlr. Therefore,
encoding Υ(R) characterizes regressor R.
Theorem 4.3 (regressor encoding). Let Rˆ be the valua-
tion function of regressor R. If Υ(R) evaluates to True,
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then there exist a truth assignment ~x ∈ Rm, out ∈ R,
such that Rˆ(~x) = out.
Proof. The proof follows from the definitions and
Lemma 4.2.
Given GBC C = 〈R1, . . . , Rc〉 and following Theo-
rem 4.3, we define the encoding of classifier C to be the
formula Γ(C) as follows:
Γ(C) :
c∧
j=1
Υ(Rj)∧
c∨
j=1
(
arg = j ↔
c∧
k=1
outj > outk
)
Intuitively, Γ(C) consists of two parts: (i) the conjunc-
tion of all regressor encodings, ensuring that the regressor
valuation variables out1, . . . , outr are restricted to their
respective regressor valuations; and (ii) a restriction of
the classifier valuation variable arg to be the maximal
regressor valuation (i.e., operator arg max). Therefore,
Γ(C) charactarizes classifier C.
Theorem 4.4 (classifier encoding). Let Cˆ be the valua-
tion function of classifier C. If Γ(C) evaluates to True,
then there exist a truth assignment ~x ∈ Rm, arg ∈
{1, . . . , c}, such that Cˆ(~x) = arg.
Proof. The proof follows from the definitions, theorem,
and lemmas above.
5 Encodings of Local Robustness
Properties
In this section, we encode the local robustness proper-
ties defined in Section 3. Recall that a regression model
(resp., classification model) satisifies local adversarial ro-
bustness for an input ~x (Definitions 3.1, and 3.2), if for
all ~x′, if ||~x − ~x′||p < , then the difference between the
valuation of ~x, and that of ~x′ is bound (resp., we get the
same classification for ~x, and for ~x′).
Our goal is to find whether there exists an assignment to
~x′ that satisfies both the model encoding, and the negation
of the local adversarial robustness property. An assign-
ment ~x′ that satisfies both conjuncts constitutes a counter-
example that disproves local adversarial robustness of the
given input ~x. Alternatively, local adversarial robustness
holds if there is no such assignment.
Given an input ~x, and , δ ≥ 0, we define the encod-
ing of local adversarial robustness to be a formula Φ as
follows:
Φ : φ ∧
m∧
i=1
{
|xi − x′i| ≤ , xi ∈ R
x′i ∈ {v ∈ N : |xi − v| ≤ }, xi ∈ N
Where φ is |Rˆ(~x) − Rˆ(~x′)| ≥ δ for regression model,
and φ is Cˆ(~x) 6= Cˆ(~x′) for classification model. Note that
the second range of conjuncts in the expression, charac-
terizes the allowed pertubations (||~x−~x′||p < ) for norm
p = ∞, which is handled differently for real, and integer
features.
6 Optimizations
While the construction in Sections 4 and 5 is sound and
complete, it is not always the most efficient one. Thus,
we now provide two optimizations based on eliminating
redundant clauses that cannot be satisfied, and on paral-
lelizing the verification process.
6.1 Pruning
“Pruning” is a somewhat overloaded term. In the context
of machine learning, pruning typically refers to the pro-
cess of removing sections of decision trees that have lit-
tle impact on the outcome, thus reducing over-fitting. In
the model-checking community, pruning is the process of
trimming unreachable parts of the search space, thus help-
ing the model checker focus its search.
Our approach combines these two notions. Namely, we
remove all unsatisfiable leaf clauses with respect to the
robustness parameter (), which allows for faster calcula-
tion. Formally, given DTS D = 〈N, I, L〉 and property
Φ, we define the Φ-pruned encoding of leaf l in tree D to
be:
piΦ(l) =
{
pi(l), pi(l) ∧ Φ is satisfiable
False, pi(l) ∧ Φ is unsatisfiable
Note that pruning can be applied to diverse properties, but
this work is focused on the robustness property.
Next, we define the corresponding ΥΦ (resp., ΓΦ) to be
the Φ-pruned encoding of regressor R (resp., Φ-pruned
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encoding of classifier C), which replaces each occur-
rence of leaf encoding pi(l) with its pruned version piΦ(l).
The following theorem establishes the correctness of Φ-
pruning:
Theorem 6.1 (safe pruning).
1. Regressor: the conjunction Υ(R) ∧ Φ is satisfiable, if
and only if, the conjunction ΥΦ(R) ∧ Φ is satisfiable.
2. Classifier: the conjunction Γ(C) ∧ Φ is satisfiable, if
and only if, the conjunction ΓΦ(C) ∧ Φ is satisfiable.
Proof. The proofs follow immediately from the associa-
tivity property of propositional logic.
In principle, we may use an SMT solver to check the
satisfiability of pi(l) ∧ Φ for each leaf, in each tree. In
practice, we reduce the dependence on SMT solvers and
increase scalability by evaluating the robustness property
during the encoding of the tree, where each internal node
condition constraints a single feature xi. For norm p =
∞, the leaf valuation pi(l) is satisfiable, if and only if for
every node n ∈ path(l) that refers to feature xi, |xi −
x′i| ≤ . For norm p = 1, a necessary condition for the
satisfiability of pi(l), is that all features of ~x′,
∑m
i=1 di ≤
, where:
di =
{
|xi − x′i|, xi appears in path(l)
0, xi does not appear in path(l)
The pruning process removes paths where the given vec-
tor ~x′ is “far” from the required thresholds by more than
, where the notion of distance is determined by the norm.
6.2 Parallelization
It is difficult to parallelize general SMT formulas effi-
ciently. To increase scalability, we design our encoding
in a manner that allows for parallel evaluation of gradi-
ent boosted classifiers. We do so by checking the robust-
ness property separately for each class index. If all parallel
evaluations are found robust, then the robustness property
holds. Otherwise, there exists an assignment ~x, and an in-
dex q, such that the robustness property does not hold,
and ~x is a counter-example. The thread of class q would
discover this case and abort all other threads.
Formally, we do the following:
∀~x′ : ||~x− ~x′||p < → Cˆ(~x) = Cˆ(~x′)
⇔¬∃~x′ : ||~x− ~x′||p <  ∧ Cˆ(~x) 6= Cˆ(~x′)
⇔¬∃~x′ : ||~x− ~x′||p <  ∧ Cˆ(~x) 6= arg maxj
(
Rˆj(~x
′)
)
⇔¬∃~x′ : ||~x− ~x′||p <  ∧ ∃q : Rˆq(~x′) > RˆCˆ(~x)(~x′)
⇔¬∃~x′, q : ||~x− ~x′||p <  ∧ Rˆq(~x′) > RˆCˆ(~x)(~x′)
Where the parameter q is within [1, c], and each thread
verifies a different value of q. For example, if an input is
classified as class a, we invoke c − 1 threads for classes
{1, . . . , c} \ {a}, where each thread tries to verify robust-
ness with respect to a specific class.
7 Evaluation
We now introduce VERIGB (Verifier of Gradient Boosted
models), which implements our approach in Python.
VERIGB utilizes Z3 [8] as the underlying SMT solver. We
used the sklearn [5] and numpy [16] packages to train
models. We conducted the experiments on a VM with 36
cores, a CPU speed of 2.4 GHz, a total of 150 GB mem-
ory, and the Ubuntu 16.04 operating system. The VM is
hosted by a designated server with two Intel Xeon E5-
2680v2 processors (each processor is made of 28 cores at
2.4 Ghz), 260 GB memory, and Red Hat Enterprise Linux
Server 7.3 operating system. For tractability, we capped
the runtime of verifying the local robustness property by
10 minutes. We evaluated VERIGB using the following
three datasets:
1. The House Sales in King County (HSKC) dataset con-
taining 22K observations of houses sold in between
May 2014 and May 2015 in King County, USA [14].
Each observation has 19 house features, as well as the
sale price.
2. The Modified National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (MNIST) dataset containing 70K images of
handwritten digits [18]. The images are of size 28 x
28 pixels, each with a grayscale value ranging from 0
to 255. The images are classified into 10 classes, one
for each digit.
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Figure 2: Universal robustness eveluation for  = 160
sq/ft, and δ = 100K$, and regressors with a similar score.
Illustrating the attainable portion of robust observations ρ,
varying the number of trees and the tree depth.
3. The German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GT-
SRB) dataset containing 50K colored images of traffic
signs [13]. The images are of size 32 x 32 pixels, each
with three values (RGB) ranging from 0 to 255. The
images are classified into 43 classes, one for each traf-
fic sign.
7.1 Regressor Evaluation
We start by demonstrating VERIGB’s scalability to large
gradient boosted regression models using the HSKC
dataset. We trained regressors varying the learning rates
in {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}, the number of trees between 50 and
500, and the tree depth in {3, 5, 8, 10}. All models have
a similar score2 that varies between 0.84 and 0.88. Then
we randomly selected 200 observations and evaluated the
ρ-universal (, δ)-robustness property with an  value of
160 sq/ft, for the 6 numerical features that refer to square
footage, and a δ value of 100K$ in the price. Note that
there were no timeouts (where it took the SMT solver
more than 10 minutes to reach a decision) for models with
less than 500 trees, and even with 500 trees we had only
16% timeouts.
Figure 2 illustrates the results for a learning rate of 0.1,
while the results for other learning rates are similar. No-
tice that (i) robustness degrades as the number of trees in-
creases. (ii) robustness seems to be negatively correlated
2The term score refers to the coefficient of determination R2 of the
prediction.
Figure 3: Examples of GTSRB images that satisfy the lo-
cal adversarial robustness property for  = 3.
with the tree depth. That is, a model trained with a tree
depth of 3 is more robust than a depth of 5, which is more
robust than 8 and 10.
7.2 Classifier Evaluation
Next, we demonstrate VERIGB’s capability to verify the
robustness of accurate classification models. We trained
gradient boosted models for the MNIST and GTSRB
datasets with a learning rate of 0.1. We varied the number
of trees between 20 and 100, and the maximal tree depth
between 3 and 20. The accuracy of said models varied be-
tween 87.9% and 97.3% for MNIST, and between 90%
and 96.86% for GTSRB. We evaluated the ρ-universal -
robustness property with  values of 1, 3, and 5. We ran-
domly selected 20 images from each class in the training
set (200 images for MNIST, and 860 images for GTSRB).
The illustration in Figure 1 is an artifact of this evalu-
ation. Recall, that it shows two examples where the local
adversarial robustness property does not hold for  = 3
for a model trained for the GTSRB dataset. In the first ex-
ample, an “80” km/h speed limit sign is misclassified as
a “30” km/h limit. In the second example, a “turn left”
sign is misclassified as an “ahead only” sign. Alterna-
tively, Figure 3 shows examples of signs that do satisfy
the local adversarial robustness property for  = 3. That
is, their classification would not change under any adver-
sarial perturbation that changes each pixel’s RGB values
by at most 3.
Figure 4 shows examples of handwritten digits that sat-
isfy the local adversarial robustness property for  = 3,
for models trained for the MNIST dataset. Alternatively,
Figure 5 shows two examples where the local adversarial
robustness property does not hold. In the first example, an
image of “1” is misclassified as “7”. The second image is
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Figure 4: Examples of MNIST images that satisfy the lo-
cal adversarial robustness property for  = 3.
Figure 5: Examples of MNIST images that do not satisfy
local adversarial robustness for  = 3. In the first row, an
image of “1” is misclassified as “7”. In the second row,
an image of “5” is misclassified as “0”. Observe in the
third column (delta) that the applied changes are barely
visible to the naked eye (delta of +/-3 in the range of 256
values per pixel per color). The fourth column highlights
the modified pixels.
misclassified as “0” instead of “5” under very slight per-
turbation. These modifications are almost invisible to a
human eye. Note that the model’s confidence does not in-
dicate robustness. E.g., in the first example the image has
95% confidence to be classified as 1, while after apply-
ing the perturbation, it has 90% confidence while being
misclassified as 7.
Scalability and limitations
Table 1 summarizes the results for selected models trained
for the MNIST dataset. In the table, the abbreviations
“T/O” and “C/E” stand for the portion of timeouts and
counter-examples, respectively. Note that for a fixed tree
depth, the portion of counter-examples found is negatively
correlated with the model’s accuracy. This is also true
for a fixed number of trees. In this example, large mod-
els with 100 trees and high tree depth already exhibit a
non-negligible portion of timeouts, indicating the limita-
tions of VERIGB. Despite that fact, it successfully ver-
ifies highly accurate models for the MNIST dataset. We
run similar experiments on models trained for the GTSRB
dataset, with roughly similar results. Unlike MNIST, the
portion of timeouts was only 1%, even for large models.
As with MNIST, the portion of counter-examples varies
between 10% and 22%. Finally, the ratio of robust images
varies between 78% and 88%.
The effect of model structure on robustness As a
side-effect of this research, we noticed that certain con-
figuration parameters tend to result in more robust mod-
els. Hereafter, we briefly discuss our observations. Ta-
ble 2 summarizes selected results for models with a sim-
ilar accuracy which is achieved by varying the number of
trees, and the tree depth. As can be observed, models with
smaller tree depth have a higher ρ value. The results show
that the tree depth has a potentially large impact on ro-
bustness. That is, increasing the tree depth leads to less
robust results. Notice that tree depth similarly affects the
robustness of regression models, as is clearly indicated in
Figure 2.
It is interesting to mention, that tree depth also plays a
role in the over-fitting problem of gradient boosted mod-
els. Models with large tree depth are more likely to suffer
from over-fitting [12]. In our context, a small tree depth
yields better robustness and is also easier to verify, mak-
ing VERIGB attractive for practical use cases.
8 Related Work
Reliability and security are of increasing interest by the
research community. Numerous works demonstrate the
(lack of) security of popular machine learning mod-
els [4, 3, 2]. Others show methods to generate adversarial
inputs to such models [29]. Thus, certifying that specific
models are robust to adversarial inputs is an important re-
search challenge. Indeed [22, 17, 11], introduced methods
for verifying robustness for various types of neural net-
work models. The robustness of gradient boosted mod-
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Depth Trees Accuracy  = 1  = 3  = 5Verified (ρ) T/O C/E Verified (ρ) T/O C/E Verified (ρ) T/O C/E
3 20 87.9 16.5% 0% 83.5% 10% 0% 90% 10% 0% 90%
3 50 92.4 24% 0% 76% 24% 0% 79% 21% 0% 79%
3 100 94.4 39.5% 0.5% 60% 31.5% 0.5% 68% 31.5% 0.5% 68%
8 20 94.8 39.5% 0% 60.5% 21% 0% 79% 21% 0% 79%
8 50 96.4 53.5% 6% 40.5% 40% 9.5% 50.5% 42.5% 7% 50.5%
8 100 97 29% 41.5% 29.5% 20% 45% 35% 22% 43.5% 34.5%
10 20 95.6 39.5% 0% 60.5% 25% 0% 75% 25% 0% 75%
10 50 96.7 53% 8.5% 38.5% 39.6% 10.6% 49.8% 46% 8.5% 45.5%
10 100 97.3 15% 60% 25% 10.5% 62.5% 27% 11.5% 62.5% 26%
Table 1: MNIST dataset: Evaluating the attainable portion of robust observations ρ, for models with varying number
of trees, tree depth, and . The abbreviations “T/O” and “C/E” stand for the portion of timeouts and counter-examples,
respectively.
Depth Trees Accuracy Verified (ρ) T/O C/E
4 100 95.6 53% 3% 44%
5 65 95.7 52% 1% 47%
7 40 95.8 52% 0.5% 47.5%
10 20 95.6 39.5% 0% 60.5%
20 18 95.8 27.5% 0.0% 72.5%
Table 2: MNIST dataset: Impact of boosted model’s ar-
chitecture on the attainable ρ for the universal adversarial
robustness property with  = 1.
els is also of interest, but existing works are focused on
empirical evaluation [19], or on training methods that in-
crease robustness [25], while our work is the first to certify
gradient boosted models with formal and rigorous analy-
sis.
Since our work is the first and only work that verifies
gradient boosted model, we survey existing works that
verify other machine learning models. In [15], the au-
thors suggest an SMT based approach for verifying feed-
forward multi-layer neural networks. They use a white
box approach to analyze the neural network layer by layer
and also apply a set of methods to discover adversarial
inputs. Note that gradient boosted models are fundamen-
tally different from neural networks and thus their method
does not extend to such models. In [17], the authors de-
scribe a Simplex based verification technique, that is ex-
tended to handle the non-convex Rectified Linear Unit
(ReLU) activation functions. Such activation is funda-
mental in modern neural networks and is not expressible
with linear programming. The main disadvantage of that
approach is its inability to scale up to large networks with
thousands of ReLU nodes.
Alternatively, AI2 [11] uses “abstract transformers” to
overcome the difficulty of formally describing non-linear
activation functions. Safety properties such as robustness
are then proved based on the abstract interpretation. The
over-approximation that is inherent in the technique al-
lows for scalable analysis. However, since they use ab-
stractions, the counter-examples provided are not always
real counter-examples, and thus a refinement process is
required to end up with a concrete counter-example.
Finally, the authors of [22] adapt Boolean satisfiabil-
ity to verify the robustness of Binarized Neural Net-
works (BNN). Specifically, they apply a counter-example-
guided search procedure to check for robustness to adver-
sarial perturbations. They verified BNN models for the
MNIST dataset. In comparison, VERIGB verifies slightly
more accurate gradient boosted models for the same
dataset. Similarly, in [9] the authors propose a method
for verification of feed-forward neural networks. Their
approach leverages piece-wise linear activation functions.
The main idea is to use a linear approximation of the over-
all network behavior that can then be solved by SMT or
ILP.
9 Conclusions and Future Work
Our work is the first to verify robustness to adversarial
perturbations for gradient boosted models. Such models
are among the most popular machine learning techniques
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in practice. Our work introduces a model verification tool
called VERIGB that transforms the challenge of certify-
ing gradient boosted regression and classification models
into the task of checking the satisfiability of an SMT for-
mula that describes the model and the required robustness
property. This novel encoding is an important contribu-
tion of our work and includes formal correctness proofs as
well as performance optimizations. Once we have such an
(optimized) SMT formula, we check its satisfiability with
a standard solver. The solver either proves the robustness
property or provides a counter-example.
We extensively evaluated VERIGB, with 3 public
datasets, and demonstrated its scalability to large and
accurate models with hundreds of trees. Our evaluation
shows that the classification’s confidence does not pro-
vide a good indication of robustness. Further, it indicates
that models with a small tree depth tend to be more ro-
bust even if the overall accuracy is similar. Such models
are also known to suffer less from over-fitting. We believe
that there may be an implicit correlation between robust-
ness and good generalization, and leave further investi-
gation to future work. Additionally, the counter-examples
generated by VERIGB may be leveraged in the training
phase of the gradient boosted models to optimize their ro-
bustness. However, we leave such usage for future work.
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